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yuancheng
2026-07-19 18:01:05 +08:00
commit fe4b286ce1
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<?php
/**
* Configuration backup & restore.
*
* Two POST actions:
* - download: zips the operator's config files into
* /tmp/config_backup.zip and sends it as a download. Files
* are listed once in {@see backup_files()} and shared with
* the restore handler so the two paths cannot drift.
* - restore: accepts a ZIP upload, validates it, extracts a
* known-safe subset into /tmp/config_restore/, stops every
* DV service, atomically installs each file at its mapped
* target, then restarts services.
*
* Security model (post-#16 remediation):
* - Upload is finfo_file()-typechecked, size-capped, then
* moved to a fixed temp filename — the operator-supplied
* name never reaches a path concat.
* - ZIP entries are filtered against backup_files() before
* extraction. Anything not on the allowlist (including any
* entry whose name contains `/`, `\`, or starts with `.`)
* is silently skipped — no zip-slip vector remains.
* - The blind `sudo mv -v -f /tmp/config_restore/* /etc/`
* pattern is replaced by per-file `sudo install -m … -o
* root -g root` driven by the same allowlist. No glob ever
* reaches the shell after extraction.
* - The two post-restore "re-apply from restored config"
* paths (timezone via shell-interpolated config.php grep,
* and remotePassword via shell-interpolated sed-i) are
* replaced by data-side propagation: timezone validated
* against DateTimeZone::listIdentifiers() and passed via
* escapeshellarg(), remotePassword routed through
* config_writer's privileged-flat helper (no shell sees
* the value).
*
* Backup contents (and therefore the restore allowlist) are
* defined ONCE in {@see backup_files()}. Files NOT in that list
* are deliberately NOT backed up — notably /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf
* and /root/.Remote Control, which carry secrets that should
* never leave the device in a portable form.
*/
require_once($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'] . '/config/security_headers.php');
require_once($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'] . '/config/banner_warnings.inc');
setSecurityHeaders();
require_once($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'].'/config/csrf.php');
require_once($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'].'/config/config_writer.php');
/**
* Canonical map of files in a Pi-Star backup ZIP.
*
* Single source of truth: the backup loop iterates this map to
* decide what to package, and the restore loop iterates this map
* to decide what to install (and where). ZIP entries with names
* outside the keys here are silently ignored on restore.
*
* key = basename inside the ZIP (the backup is a zip -j
* "junk paths" archive — every entry sits at the
* archive root with no directory component).
* value = absolute target path on the device.
*
* Files NOT in this map are deliberately excluded from backup:
* - /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf (AP wpa_passphrase secret)
* - /root/.Remote Control (linker password secret)
* - /etc/sudoers* / /etc/passwd (system auth)
*
* @return array<string, array{0:string, 1:int, 2:string, 3:string}>
* basename => [path, mode, owner, group]
*/
function backup_files()
{
// Each entry is [path, mode, owner, group]. The mode/owner/group
// tuple is what the restore loop passes to `sudo install -m -o
// -g`, and MUST match the corresponding /etc/sudoers.d/pistar-
// dashboard PISTAR_DASH_INSTALL line for that destination — or
// sudo will reject the install and the file will silently fail
// to restore. Pre-2026-05-01 the restore loop used a hardcoded
// `install -m 644 -o root -g root` for every entry, which
// worked under the old NOPASSWD: ALL sudoers but breaks under
// the path-scoped allowlist for: the .key files (require 600
// www-data:www-data so the dashboard's per-page sudo-less
// parse_ini_file() reads still work — see fulledit_bmapikey.php
// for the full rationale), wpa_supplicant.conf (600 root:root),
// and the three system files (dhcpcd.conf, hosts, hostname)
// which have no install entry in the deployed sudoers at all
// and rely on a re-spun image to gain them.
return array(
// Network / WiFi
'dhcpcd.conf' => array('/etc/dhcpcd.conf', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'wpa_supplicant.conf' => array('/etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf', 600, 'root', 'root'),
// Gateway daemon configs (flat key=value INI-ish)
'ircddbgateway' => array('/etc/ircddbgateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'mmdvmhost' => array('/etc/mmdvmhost', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'dstarrepeater' => array('/etc/dstarrepeater', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'dapnetgateway' => array('/etc/dapnetgateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'p25gateway' => array('/etc/p25gateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'm17gateway' => array('/etc/m17gateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'ysfgateway' => array('/etc/ysfgateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'ysf2dmr' => array('/etc/ysf2dmr', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'dgidgateway' => array('/etc/dgidgateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'nxdngateway' => array('/etc/nxdngateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'dmrgateway' => array('/etc/dmrgateway', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'mobilegps' => array('/etc/mobilegps', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'starnetserver' => array('/etc/starnetserver', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'timeserver' => array('/etc/timeserver', 644, 'root', 'root'),
// Mode markers (operator has at most one of these)
'dstar-radio.mmdvmhost' => array('/etc/dstar-radio.mmdvmhost', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'dstar-radio.dstarrepeater' => array('/etc/dstar-radio.dstarrepeater', 644, 'root', 'root'),
// Pi-Star service / dashboard config
'pistar-remote' => array('/etc/pistar-remote', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'hosts' => array('/etc/hosts', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'hostname' => array('/etc/hostname', 644, 'root', 'root'),
// .key files: 600 www-data so unprivileged dashboard reads
// (banner_warnings.inc, bm_links.php, bm_manager.php — all
// parse_ini_file() without sudo) still work post-restore.
'bmapi.key' => array('/etc/bmapi.key', 600, 'www-data', 'www-data'),
'dapnetapi.key' => array('/etc/dapnetapi.key', 600, 'www-data', 'www-data'),
'pistar-css.ini' => array('/etc/pistar-css.ini', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'RSSI.dat' => array('/usr/local/etc/RSSI.dat', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'ircddblocal.php' => array('/var/www/dashboard/config/ircddblocal.php', 644, 'root', 'root'),
'config.php' => array('/var/www/dashboard/config/config.php', 644, 'root', 'root'),
);
}
// CSRF protection — see config/csrf.php for the full rationale.
// Must run BEFORE any output: bootstraps the session on GET (so
// Set-Cookie ships) and rejects forged POSTs cleanly with 403
// before the download / restore handlers run.
//
// CSRF protection here makes C1's zip-slip / restore-pipeline RCE
// harder to exploit (attacker can no longer trigger restore via a
// cross-site click); the underlying bugs in the restore handler
// remain — they are tracked separately as the C1/C2 work-on-hold.
csrf_verify();
// Layer 2 of the default-password protection — see config/banner_warnings.inc.
// MUST run BEFORE any output so header('Location: ...') works.
pistar_warnings_enforce_redirect();
// Load the language support
require_once('config/language.php');
// Load the Pi-Star Release file
$pistarReleaseConfig = '/etc/pistar-release';
$configPistarRelease = array();
$configPistarRelease = parse_ini_file($pistarReleaseConfig, true);
// Load the Version Info
require_once('config/version.php');
// Sanity Check that this file has been opened correctly
if ($_SERVER["PHP_SELF"] == "/admin/config_backup.php") {
// Sanity Check Passed.
header('Cache-Control: no-cache');
// session_start() is no longer called here — csrf_verify() at
// the top of the file already started the session via
// csrf_session_start(). A second session_start() would emit a
// "session is already active" NOTICE on PHP 8.x.
?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" lang="en">
<head>
<meta name="robots" content="index" />
<meta name="robots" content="follow" />
<meta name="language" content="English" />
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1" />
<meta name="Author" content="Andrew Taylor (MW0MWZ)" />
<meta name="Description" content="Pi-Star Power" />
<meta name="KeyWords" content="Pi-Star" />
<meta http-equiv="Cache-Control" content="no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate" />
<meta http-equiv="pragma" content="no-cache" />
<link rel="shortcut icon" href="images/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" />
<meta http-equiv="Expires" content="0" />
<title>Pi-Star - <?php echo $lang['digital_voice']." ".$lang['dashboard']." - ".$lang['backup_restore'];?></title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/pistar-css.php" />
</head>
<body>
<?php pistar_warnings_render(); ?>
<div class="container">
<div class="header">
<div style="font-size: 8px; text-align: right; padding-right: 8px;">Pi-Star:<?php echo $configPistarRelease['Pi-Star']['Version']?> / <?php echo $lang['dashboard'].": ".$version; ?></div>
<h1>Pi-Star <?php echo $lang['digital_voice']." - ".$lang['backup_restore'];?></h1>
<p style="padding-right: 5px; text-align: right; color: #ffffff;">
<a href="/" style="color: #ffffff;"><?php echo $lang['dashboard'];?></a> |
<a href="/admin/" style="color: #ffffff;"><?php echo $lang['admin'];?></a> |
<a href="/admin/power.php" style="color: #ffffff;"><?php echo $lang['power'];?></a> |
<a href="/admin/update.php" style="color: #ffffff;"><?php echo $lang['update'];?></a> |
<a href="/admin/configure.php" style="color: #ffffff;"><?php echo $lang['configuration'];?></a>
</p>
</div>
<div class="contentwide">
<?php if (!empty($_POST)) {
echo '<table width="100%">'."\n";
if ( $_POST["action"] === "download" ) {
echo "<tr><th colspan=\"2\">".$lang['backup_restore']."</th></tr>\n";
$output = "Finding config files to be backed up\n";
$backupDir = "/tmp/config_backup";
$backupZip = "/tmp/config_backup.zip";
$hostNameInfo = exec('cat /etc/hostname');
$output .= shell_exec("sudo rm -rf " . escapeshellarg($backupZip) . " 2>&1");
$output .= shell_exec("sudo rm -rf " . escapeshellarg($backupDir) . " 2>&1");
$output .= shell_exec("sudo mkdir " . escapeshellarg($backupDir) . " 2>&1");
// Iterate the canonical backup map so the backup and the
// restore allowlist cannot drift from each other. dhcpcd.conf
// is special-cased (only included when the operator has a
// static IP configured) — everything else is unconditional;
// missing source files are silently skipped (the cp returns
// an error to stderr that nobody reads, same as the legacy
// behaviour).
foreach (backup_files() as $basename => $meta) {
// $meta is [path, mode, owner, group]. The backup half
// only needs the path — mode/owner/group are consumed
// on the restore-half install command.
$srcpath = $meta[0];
if ($basename === 'dhcpcd.conf') {
// Only back up dhcpcd.conf if the operator has set a
// static IP — otherwise restoring would clobber
// working DHCP config on the target device.
if (!shell_exec('cat /etc/dhcpcd.conf | grep "static ip_address" | grep -v "#"')) {
continue;
}
}
if (file_exists($srcpath)) {
$output .= shell_exec(
"sudo cp " . escapeshellarg($srcpath) . " "
. escapeshellarg($backupDir . '/' . $basename) . " 2>&1"
);
}
}
$output .= "Compressing backup files\n";
$output .= shell_exec("sudo zip -j " . escapeshellarg($backupZip) . " " . escapeshellarg($backupDir) . "/* 2>&1");
$output .= "Starting download\n";
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
if (file_exists($backupZip)) {
$utc_time = gmdate('Y-m-d H:i:s');
$utc_tz = new DateTimeZone('UTC');
$local_tz = new DateTimeZone(date_default_timezone_get ());
$dt = new DateTime($utc_time, $utc_tz);
$dt->setTimeZone($local_tz);
$local_time = $dt->format('Y-M-d');
header('Content-Description: File Transfer');
header('Content-Type: application/octet-stream');
if ($hostNameInfo != "pi-star") {
header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="'.basename("Pi-Star_Config_".$hostNameInfo."_".$local_time.".zip").'"');
}
else {
header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="'.basename("Pi-Star_Config_$local_time.zip").'"');
}
header('Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary');
header('Expires: 0');
header('Cache-Control: must-revalidate');
header('Pragma: public');
header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($backupZip));
ob_clean();
flush();
readfile($backupZip);
exit;
}
};
if ( $_POST["action"] === "restore" ) {
echo "<tr><th colspan=\"2\">Config Restore</th></tr>\n";
$output = "Uploading your Config data\n";
// Wrap the whole restore in a do/while(false) so an early
// bail-out (upload validation failure, ZIP parse error,
// unsafe entry name, etc.) can break cleanly out of the
// sequence without an `if/else` pyramid. PHP 7.0+ idiom.
do {
// Hardened restore pipeline. See the file-level docblock for
// the security model. Constants here:
// - $target_dir is hardcoded; the operator-supplied filename
// never touches a path concat.
// - $upload_path is also hardcoded; we move the uploaded
// temp file to a known name before any further processing.
// - $max_zip_bytes caps the upload; a real Pi-Star backup
// is ~25 KB, nginx already caps the body at 512 KB, so
// 256 KB is generous.
$target_dir = '/tmp/config_restore';
$upload_path = '/tmp/config_restore_upload.zip';
$max_zip_bytes = 256 * 1024;
$allowlist = backup_files();
shell_exec("sudo rm -rf " . escapeshellarg($target_dir) . " 2>&1");
shell_exec("rm -f " . escapeshellarg($upload_path) . " 2>&1");
shell_exec("mkdir -p " . escapeshellarg($target_dir) . " 2>&1");
// ----- Upload validation -------------------------------------
$upload_ok = false;
$err_msg = '';
if (!isset($_FILES['fileToUpload']) ||
$_FILES['fileToUpload']['error'] !== UPLOAD_ERR_OK) {
$err_msg = 'No file uploaded, or upload failed.';
} elseif ($_FILES['fileToUpload']['size'] <= 0 ||
$_FILES['fileToUpload']['size'] > $max_zip_bytes) {
$err_msg = 'Upload size out of range (expected up to '
. round($max_zip_bytes / 1024) . ' KB).';
} else {
$tmp_name = $_FILES['fileToUpload']['tmp_name'];
// finfo_file() reads the magic bytes — much harder for an
// attacker to fake than the client-supplied $_FILES['type'].
$finfo = finfo_open(FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE);
$magic = $finfo ? finfo_file($finfo, $tmp_name) : '';
if ($finfo) finfo_close($finfo);
if ($magic !== 'application/zip') {
$err_msg = 'Uploaded file is not a ZIP archive (detected '
. htmlspecialchars($magic, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . ').';
} elseif (!move_uploaded_file($tmp_name, $upload_path)) {
$err_msg = 'Could not stage upload to ' . $upload_path . '.';
} else {
$upload_ok = true;
}
}
if (!$upload_ok) {
$output .= $err_msg . "\n";
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
// Don't emit </table> here — the outer code does it once
// after the if-action blocks finish. The "Go Back" button
// is rendered AFTER the table closes (see end of file).
break;
}
// ----- ZIP entry validation ---------------------------------
// Open the archive and decide which entries to extract BEFORE
// any extraction happens. An entry is admitted iff:
// - its name appears verbatim as a key in $allowlist
// (basename → target map), AND
// - its name contains no `/`, no `\`, and does not start
// with `.` (defence in depth — the backup writer uses
// `zip -j` so directory components are never legitimate).
// Entries outside the allowlist are silently skipped — that's
// the documented behaviour for forward-compat with future
// Pi-Star versions adding new files.
$zip = new ZipArchive();
if ($zip->open($upload_path) !== true) {
$output .= "Could not open the uploaded ZIP.\n";
@unlink($upload_path);
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
break;
}
$admit = array();
for ($i = 0; $i < $zip->numFiles; $i++) {
$name = $zip->getNameIndex($i);
if ($name === false || $name === '') {
continue;
}
if (strpos($name, '/') !== false ||
strpos($name, '\\') !== false ||
strpos($name, "\0") !== false ||
$name[0] === '.') {
// Path-traversal / hidden / NUL-injection attempt.
// Reject the whole archive — this is well outside any
// Pi-Star-generated backup shape. break 2 exits the
// for() AND the surrounding do/while(false) early-
// exit block in one hop.
$zip->close();
@unlink($upload_path);
$output .= "Refusing ZIP — entry '"
. htmlspecialchars(substr($name, 0, 64), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')
. "' has an unsafe name.\n";
error_log("config_backup: rejected ZIP with unsafe entry '$name'");
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
break 2;
}
if (isset($allowlist[$name])) {
$admit[$name] = $i;
}
// else: silently ignored — unknown filename.
}
// Extract only the admitted entries into $target_dir. We use
// ZipArchive::extractTo() with an explicit entry list so
// ANYTHING outside that list is left in the archive and
// never written to disk.
$entries_to_extract = array_keys($admit);
if (empty($entries_to_extract)) {
$zip->close();
@unlink($upload_path);
$output .= "ZIP contained no recognised Pi-Star config files.\n";
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
break;
}
if (!$zip->extractTo($target_dir, $entries_to_extract)) {
$zip->close();
@unlink($upload_path);
$output .= "Failed to extract ZIP entries.\n";
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
break;
}
$zip->close();
@unlink($upload_path);
$output .= "Your .zip file was uploaded and unpacked ("
. count($entries_to_extract) . " files).\n";
// ----- Service stop ----------------------------------------
$output .= "Stopping Services.\n";
$stop_services = array(
'cron.service', 'dstarrepeater.service', 'mmdvmhost.service',
'ircddbgateway.service', 'timeserver.service',
'pistar-watchdog.service', 'pistar-remote.service',
'ysfgateway.service', 'ysf2dmr.service', 'p25gateway.service',
'nxdngateway.service', 'm17gateway.service',
'dapnetgateway.service', 'mobilegps.service',
);
foreach ($stop_services as $svc) {
shell_exec('sudo systemctl stop ' . escapeshellarg($svc) . ' 2>&1');
}
shell_exec('sudo mount -o remount,rw / 2>&1');
// ----- Per-file install ------------------------------------
// Replace the previous blind `sudo mv -v -f /tmp/.../* /etc/`
// with a per-file `sudo install -m 644 -o root -g root` driven
// by the canonical map. install is atomic on same-fs (rename)
// and falls back to safe copy across filesystems. The mode and
// owner are forced regardless of how the file arrived in the
// archive.
$output .= "Writing new Config\n";
// Tear down stale dstar-radio.* markers first — only one of
// the two can be in use, and the restored archive may carry
// a different mode than the device currently has. Use
// `rm -rf` (not `rm -f`) so the call matches the
// PISTAR_DASH_MARKERS sudoers entry — different argv tokens
// yield different sudoers matches, and only `-rf` is
// allowlisted.
shell_exec('sudo rm -rf /etc/dstar-radio.* 2>&1');
$installed = 0;
foreach ($admit as $basename => $_idx) {
$src = $target_dir . '/' . $basename;
$meta = $allowlist[$basename];
$target = $meta[0];
$mode = (string)$meta[1];
$owner = $meta[2];
$group = $meta[3];
if (!file_exists($src)) {
// Should be impossible after a successful extractTo,
// but guard anyway — extraction can fail per-entry on
// unusual archives without throwing.
continue;
}
// Per-file install args from backup_files() metadata —
// mode/owner/group must match the deployed sudoers
// PISTAR_DASH_INSTALL line for $target or sudo will
// reject. The hardcoded `install -m 644 -o root -g root`
// here used to silently fail on .key files (require
// 600 www-data:www-data) and wpa_supplicant.conf
// (600 root:root) under the path-scoped sudoers.
$cmd = 'sudo install -m ' . $mode
. ' -o ' . escapeshellarg($owner)
. ' -g ' . escapeshellarg($group) . ' '
. escapeshellarg($src) . ' '
. escapeshellarg($target);
$rc = 0; $cmd_out = array();
exec($cmd . ' 2>&1', $cmd_out, $rc);
if ($rc === 0) {
$installed++;
} else {
$output .= " install failed for $basename: "
. implode(' / ', $cmd_out) . "\n";
}
}
$output .= "Installed $installed file(s).\n";
// ----- Post-restore re-applies (data-side, not shell) -----
// Timezone: the restored config.php contains the operator's
// timezone in a date_default_timezone_set('…') call. We want
// the OS clock to match the dashboard's view. PRE-fix this
// path was a shell pipeline interpolating the grepped value;
// post-fix we extract via PHP-side parsing and validate
// strictly against PHP's own list of valid timezone IDs
// before passing through escapeshellarg().
$cfg_path = '/var/www/dashboard/config/config.php';
if (is_readable($cfg_path)) {
$cfg = file_get_contents($cfg_path);
if (preg_match("/date_default_timezone_set\\(\\s*['\"]([^'\"]+)['\"]\\s*\\)/",
$cfg, $m)) {
$tz = $m[1];
if (in_array($tz, DateTimeZone::listIdentifiers(), true)) {
shell_exec('sudo timedatectl set-timezone '
. escapeshellarg($tz) . ' 2>&1');
} else {
error_log("config_backup: skipping unknown timezone '$tz' from restored config.php");
}
}
}
// ircDDBGateway Remote Control password: the restored
// /etc/ircddbgateway carries `remotePassword=...`; the
// /root/.Remote Control sibling file (mode 600 root:root,
// not in the backup set) needs the same value or the
// remotecontrold tool can't reach the daemon.
//
// Pre-fix this was a shell-interpolated `sudo sed -i ...`.
// Post-fix: read via PHP-side fopen/fgets (the file is mode
// 644 root:root after we just installed it, so www-data can
// read it back), validate, then route through the helper's
// privileged-flat editor — same primitive the C6.7 fix uses
// and also what the configure.php confPassword handler now
// uses. No shell ever sees the value.
$rp_target = '/etc/ircddbgateway';
if (is_readable($rp_target)) {
$rp = '';
foreach (file($rp_target, FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES) as $line) {
if (strpos($line, 'remotePassword=') === 0) {
$rp = substr($line, strlen('remotePassword='));
break;
}
}
// ircDDBGateway accepts arbitrary printable bytes for the
// password; the helper's NUL/CR/LF guard is the floor.
if ($rp !== '' && !preg_match('/[\x00\r\n]/', $rp)) {
config_writer_stage_privileged_flat(
'/root/.Remote Control', 'password', $rp
);
config_writer_commit(false);
}
}
shell_exec('sudo mount -o remount,ro / 2>&1');
// ----- Service start ---------------------------------------
$output .= "Starting Services.\n";
$start_services = array(
'dstarrepeater.service', 'mmdvmhost.service',
'ircddbgateway.service', 'timeserver.service',
'pistar-watchdog.service', 'pistar-remote.service',
);
foreach ($start_services as $svc) {
shell_exec('sudo systemctl start ' . escapeshellarg($svc) . ' 2>&1');
}
if (substr(exec('grep "pistar-upnp.service" /etc/crontab | cut -c 1'), 0, 1) !== '#') {
shell_exec('sudo systemctl start pistar-upnp.service 2>&1');
}
$start_services_after_upnp = array(
'ysfgateway.service', 'ysf2dmr.service', 'p25gateway.service',
'nxdngateway.service', 'm17gateway.service',
'dapnetgateway.service', 'mobilegps.service', 'cron.service',
);
foreach ($start_services_after_upnp as $svc) {
shell_exec('sudo systemctl start ' . escapeshellarg($svc) . ' 2>&1');
}
// Cleanup: remove the staged extraction dir so subsequent
// restores don't see leftovers.
shell_exec("sudo rm -rf " . escapeshellarg($target_dir) . " 2>&1");
$output .= "Configuration Restore Complete.\n";
echo "<tr><td align=\"left\"><pre>"
. htmlspecialchars($output, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</pre></td></tr>\n";
} while (false); // end do/while(false) early-exit block
};
echo "</table>\n";
} else { ?>
<form action="<?php echo htmlspecialchars($_SERVER["PHP_SELF"]); ?>" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<?php csrf_field(); ?>
<table width="100%">
<tr>
<th colspan="2"><?php echo $lang['backup_restore'];?></th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="center" valign="top" width="50%">Download Configuration<br />
<button style="border: none; background: none;" name="action" value="download"><img src="/images/download.png" border="0" alt="Download Config" /></button>
</td>
<td align="center" valign="top">Restore Configuration<br />
<button style="border: none; background: none;" name="action" value="restore"><img src="/images/restore.png" border="0" alt="Restore Config" /></button><br />
<input type="file" name="fileToUpload" id="fileToUpload" />
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" align="justify">
<br />
<b>WARNING:</b><br />
Editing the files outside of Pi-Star *could* have un-desireable side effects.<br />
<br />
This backup and restore tool, will backup your config files to a Zip file, and allow you to restore them later<br />
either to this Pi-Star or another one.<br />
<ul>
<li>System Passwords / Dashboard passwords are NOT backed up / restored.</li>
<li>Wireless Configuration IS backed up and restored</li>
</ul>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
</form>
<?php } ?>
</div>
<div class="footer">
Pi-Star web config, &copy; Andy Taylor (MW0MWZ) 2014-<?php echo date("Y"); ?>.<br />
Need help? Click <a style="color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/pistarusergroup/" target="_new">here for the Support Group</a><br />
Get your copy of Pi-Star from <a style="color: #ffffff;" href="http://www.pistar.uk/downloads/" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />
<br />
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>
<?php
}